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Abstract
In macroeconomics, economists introduce most frequently imper-
fect competition on product markets using the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
monopolistic competition model. However, by assumption, this frame-
work ignores one important feature of imperfect competition: strategic
interactions between producers. Taking into account this remark and
following Yang and Hejdra (1993), this paper analyzes an overlapping
generations model where strategic interactions between producers are
introduced and examines how they aﬀect the stability properties of
the steady state. Because of free entry, strategic interactions between
producers imply a new dynamic feature, mark-up variability, promot-
ing indeterminacy and endogenous cycles. Indeed, in contrast to the
model without strategic interaction, endogenous ﬂuctuations can oc-
cur when the substitution between the production factors, capital and
labor, is not too weak, but in accordance with empirical estimates.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43, E32.
Keywords: Endogenous ﬂuctuations, imperfect competition, strategic inter-
actions, mark-up variability, capital-labor substitution, overlapping genera-
tions.
∗CNRS, Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1, Centre d'Economie de la Sor-
bonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France, Tel: (33) 1 44 07
81 99, Fax: (33) 1 44 07 82 31, e-mail: seegmu@univ-paris1.fr. I would like to thank
an anonymous referee for useful comments. I also thank Antoine d'Autume, Rodolphe
Dos Santos Ferreira, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Alain Venditti for valuable suggestions, and
participants of seminars and conferences where this paper was presented. All remaining
errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of strategic interactions between
producers on the emergence of expectation driven ﬂuctuations. We will show
that taking into account the strategic behavior of ﬁrms drastically aﬀects the
dynamics, by promoting the emergence of endogenous ﬂuctuations.
As it is well known, the most commonly used imperfectly competitive
framework in macroeconomics is based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In this
monopolistic competition model, each ﬁrm acts as a monopolist on its own
diﬀerentiated market, but has no inﬂuence on the behaviors of its competi-
tors. As a corollary, each producer takes as given aggregate variables. There-
fore, even if strategic interactions are a key element addressed by the intro-
duction of imperfect competition, they are ignored, by assumption, in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework.
In this paper, we are still concerned with a monopolistic competition
model with diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods, where the product diversity is assumed
to be endogenously determined by a zero proﬁt condition. However, follow-
ing Yang and Hejdra (1993), strategic interactions are introduced assuming
that ﬁrms take into account their inﬂuence on the aggregate price. There-
fore, the optimal behavior of ﬁrms corresponds to a (diﬀerentiated) Nash
equilibrium in prices. At equilibrium, the mark-up factor is not constant,
as in the usual Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework, but is decreasing in the
product diversity. Because of the free entry condition, the business formation
(product diversity) is procyclical and, as a consequence, the mark-up factor
is countercyclical.1 Note that these two dynamic properties are not simple
curiosities but have a large empirical support (Bils (1987), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1991), Portier (1995), Martins and Scarpetta (1999)).
To be able to compare our results with the usual monopolistic competition
economy without strategic interaction, our model admits as a particular case
the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework where producers have no inﬂuence
on the aggregate variables. Note that, in this conﬁguration, the mark-up is
constant.
To analyze the role of strategic interactions between producers on local
indeterminacy and the occurrence of endogenous cycles, we introduce this
imperfectly competitive model in a simple two-period lived overlapping gen-
1Note that, in a dynamic general equilibrium model, Gali (1995) also studies a mo-
nopolistic competition model where the mark-up factor depends on the product diversity.
However, in contrast to our paper, his approach is not based on the strategic behavior
of producers. Considering a monopolistic competition without strategic interaction, he
rather assumes that the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent varieties of goods
is increasing in the product diversity, which is the source of mark-up variability.
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erations economy, where households consume in both periods, save through
capital, and elastically supply labor at the ﬁrst period of their life.2 To un-
derline the key inﬂuence of the strategic behavior of ﬁrms on the dynamics,
we ﬁrst consider the usual monopolistic competition case without strategic
interaction. We show that the results are similar to those obtained under per-
fect competition. Indeterminacy and endogenous cycles require a suﬃciently
small capital-labor substitution. In the particular case where households only
consume at the second period of their life, we recover the results obtained by
Reichlin (1986), i.e., indeterminacy and cycles require an elasticity of capital-
labor substitution smaller than the capital share in income, that needs to be
smaller than one half.
On the contrary, under strategic interactions and mark-up variability, en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations emerge when capital and labor are high substitutes.
Indeterminacy occurs for a large range of elasticities of capital-labor substi-
tution, that encompasses the Cobb-Douglas case and all values in accordance
with empirical studies (see Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000)).3 It is also inter-
esting to notice that indeterminacy does not require large increasing returns,
as emphasized by recent empirical results (Basu and Fernald (1995), Burn-
side (1996), Basu and Fernald (1997)).4 Furthermore, the limit case often
considered in the literature where households do not consume at the ﬁrst pe-
riod5 seems to be quite speciﬁc. Indeed, as soon as households have positive
consumptions in both period, a higher degree of mark-up variability reduces
the range of capital-labor substitution for indeterminacy.
More generally, since the model developed in this paper shows that strate-
gic interactions between producers and mark-up variability promote the oc-
currence of endogenous ﬂuctuations, this underlines that imperfect compe-
tition on the product market is still an important channel to understand
expectation driven ﬂuctuations, as soon as a suﬃciently departure from the
perfect competition is considered.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we establish the existence of a steady state. We study local
dynamics in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. Several proofs are given in
2In overlapping generations economies, the relationship between endogenous ﬂuctua-
tions and mark-up variability due to business formation has also been studied by Kuhry
(2001), Seegmuller (2003) and Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005). However, in
contrast to our analysis, all these papers assume the product diversity as ﬁxed.
3See especially the numerical illustration at the end of Section 4.
4See Cazzavillan (2001) or Lloyd-Braga, Nourry, and Venditti (2007) for closely related
results obtained in overlapping generations models with productive externalities.
5See for instance Reichlin (1986), Cazzavillan (2001) or Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-
Braga (2005).
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the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
We consider an overlapping generations economy with perfect foresight and
discrete time t = 1, 2, ...,+∞. Population is constant and, for simplicity,
we assume that the population size of each generation is normalized to one.
Therefore, at each period, a representative consumer is born, living for two
periods. He supplies labor Lt at the ﬁrst period of his life, consumes all the
available goods at both period, and saves through the purchase of aggregate
capital Kt that ﬁrms use for the production in the next period.6 House-
hold's preferences, deﬁned over consumption in both period and leisure, are
summarized by the following utility function:
(1/B)U(C1t/D,C2t+1)− v(Lt) (1)
where B > 0 and D > 0 are two scaling parameters, and C1t (respectively
C2t+1), which represents consumption at the ﬁrst (second) period of life, is a
single composite good represented by the aggregate of varieties:
Cjh = N
− 1
ε−1
h
[
Nh∑
i=1
c
ε−1
ε
ijh
] ε
ε−1
, j = 1, 2, h = t, t+ 1, (2)
where cijh denotes the consumption of a single variety of good and ε > 1 the
elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent varieties. Even if equation (2)
means that there is no taste for variety,7 we assume that the representative
household consumes all the available goods at each period. We further con-
sider that the capital good is represented by the same aggregate of varieties.
Moreover, the utility function (1) has the following properties:
Assumption 1 The function U(x1, x2) is continuous for x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0
and has continuous derivatives of every required order for x1 > 0 and x2 >
0. Moreover, U(x1, x2) is increasing in x1 and x2, strongly quasi-concave,
homogeneous of degree one, and such that the indiﬀerence curves do not
cross the axes.
6This means that capital, that fully depreciates after one period of use, is predeter-
mined.
7See Benassy (1996) for more details.
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The function v(L) is continuous for 0 ≤ L ≤ L and has continuous
derivatives of every required order for 0 < L < L, where the labor endowment
L may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Furthermore, we assume that v′(L) > 0, v′′(L) ≥
0, limL→0 v′(L) = 0 and limL→L v′(L) = +∞.
The household born at period t maximizes his utility function (1) under
the two following budget constraints:
ptC1t + ptKt = wtLt (3)
pt+1C2t+1 = rt+1Kt (4)
where wt is the nominal wage, rt+1 the future nominal interest rate and pt
the price of the composite ﬁnal good. If we note ωt ≡ wt/pt the real wage
and ρt+1 ≡ rt+1/pt+1 the real interest rate, the optimal consumptions and
savings are given by:
C1t = α(Dρt+1)ωtLt (5)
C2t+1 = (1− α(Dρt+1))ρt+1ωtLt (6)
Kt = (1− α(Dρt+1))ωtLt (7)
where α(Dρt+1) ∈ (0, 1) represents the propensity to consume when young
and 1−α(Dρt+1) the propensity to save or the saving rate.8 As explained in
the Appendix, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is
given by:
η(Dρt+1) = 1− α
′(Dρt+1)Dρt+1
α(Dρt+1)(1− α(Dρt+1)) (8)
We can notice that α is increasing when there is intertemporal comple-
mentarity (η < 1) and is decreasing when there is intertemporal substitutabil-
ity (η > 1). We now deﬁne the following function:9
U∗(Dρt+1) ≡ U(α(Dρt+1), (1− α(Dρt+1))Dρt+1) (9)
where U∗′(Dρt+1)Dρt+1/U∗(Dρt+1) = 1− α(Dρt+1). Then, the labor supply
is determined by:
(1/(BD))U∗(Dρt+1)ωt = v′(Lt) (10)
Note that, under Assumption 1, the labor supply is increasing in the real
wage. Using v(L) ≡ v′′(L)L/v′(L) ∈ (0,+∞), the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the real wage is equal to 1/v(L) ∈ (0,+∞).
8The existence of the function α(Dρt+1) is established in the Appendix.
9More details are given in the Appendix.
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2.2 Firms
In the production sector, Nt ≥ 2 ﬁrms are active at period t. Each one
produces a single variety of output i using the technology:
yit = A(f(ait)lit − φ) (11)
where A > 0 is a scaling parameter, ait = kit−1/lit the capital-labor ratio, lit
the labor used by ﬁrm i and φ > 0 a ﬁxed cost. We further assume:
Assumption 2 The intensive production function f(a) is continuous for
a ≥ 0, positively valued and diﬀerentiable as many times as needed for a > 0,
with f ′(a) > 0 and f ′′(a) < 0.
Note that (11) means that the technology is characterized by a constant
marginal cost, but returns to scale are increasing because of the existence of
the ﬁxed cost φ > 0.
Because competition is imperfect, each producer maximizes its proﬁts,
facing the demand:
dit =
1
Nt
(
pit
pt
)−ε
It
pt
(12)
where It is the aggregate income, pit the price of variety i and pt the price
average, deﬁned by pt =
[
(1/Nt)
∑Nt
i=1 p
1−ε
it
]1/(1−ε)
.
Firms take as given the aggregate income It. However, to be able to
underline the role of strategic interactions on the dynamics, we consider two
cases. On the one hand, without strategic interaction between producers,
each ﬁrm neglects its eﬀect on the average price pt, which is therefore taken
as given, as usually in the monopolistic competition model developed by
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This implicitly means that each producer considers
ex ante the product diversity Nt as suﬃciently large. We deduce that the
elasticity of demand νit ≡ −(∂dit/∂pit)(pit/dit) is constant and equal to ε.
On the other hand, with strategic interactions between producers, ﬁrms take
into account their inﬂuence on the average price pt because, following Yang
and Hejdra (1993), they do not consider ex ante the product diversity Nt as
arbitrarily large. Then, ﬁrms behave as a diﬀerentiated oligopoly in prices,
i.e., their optimal behavior corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in prices. In
this case, the elasticity of demand is no more constant, but is equal to νit =
ε + (1 − ε)p1−εit /
∑Nt
i=1 p
1−ε
it . To be able to analyze and compare these two
imperfectly competitive models using the same framework, we assume that
the elasticity of demand is deﬁned by νit = ε+ τ(1− ε)p1−εit /
∑Nt
i=1 p
1−ε
it , with
τ ∈ {0, 1}.
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Since ﬁrms are identical, we focus on the ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt
maximization at the symmetric equilibrium:
ρt = (1− 1/νt)AR(at), with R(at) = f ′(at) (13)
ωt = (1− 1/νt)AW (at), with W (at) = f(at)− atf ′(at) (14)
νt = ε (1− τ/Nt) + τ/Nt > 1 , with Nt ≥ 2 (15)
where kit−1 = kt−1, lit = lt, at = kt−1/lt and pit = pt.
Note that the mark-up factor is given by νt/(νt − 1). Without strate-
gic interactions, i.e., τ = 0, this mark-up factor is constant and equal to
ε/(ε − 1). On the contrary, with strategic interactions between producers,
i.e., τ = 1, the mark-up is variable. Indeed, because the elasticity of demand
is increasing with the product diversity, the mark-up factor νt/(νt − 1) is
decreasing in Nt.10
Assuming free entry and exit, the product diversity, or equivalently the
number of ﬁrms, is determined by the usual zero proﬁt condition:
νt = f(at)lt/φ (16)
Because the production of an individual ﬁrm is given by yt = A(f(at)lt−
φ), this free entry condition is equivalent to yt = Aφ(νt − 1). Hence, in
the absence of strategic interaction, the production of an individual ﬁrm is
constant, because νt = ε. On the contrary, with strategic interactions, we get
a more reasonable result. Since νt depends on Nt, the individual production
yt is no more constant.
2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium on the capital market is ensured by Ntkt−1 = Kt−1 and equilib-
rium on the labor market by Ntlt = Lt. Then, using equations (15) and (16),
we obtain:
Nt =
f(at)Kt−1
εφat
+ τ
ε− 1
ε
(17)
This equation can be rewritten Nt = Yt/[Aφ( − 1)] + τ , where Yt =
Ntyt is the aggregate production. This means that the product diversity is
procyclical whatever the value of τ .11
10Note that Gali (1995) has also analyzed, in a dynamic setting, a monopolistic com-
petition model where the mark-up factor depends on the number of ﬁrms. However, his
approach is diﬀerent from ours because it is not founded on the strategic behavior of pro-
ducers. In his model, the usual assumptions of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) apply, except
that he further assumes that the elasticity between the diﬀerent varieties of goods is in-
creasing in the product diversity Nt, which is the key mechanism responsible for mark-up
variability.
11Since Nt ≥ 2, equation (17) implies that f(at)Kt−1/(φat) ≥ ε(2− τ) + τ .
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Using equations (15) and (17), the inverse of the mark-up factor is also
deﬁned by:
1− 1
νt
=
(ε− 1)(Nt − τ)
εNt − τ(ε− 1)
=
ε− 1
ε
(
1− τ φat
f(at)Kt−1
)
≡ m(at, Kt−1)
(18)
Without strategic interactions (τ = 0), the mark-up factor is equal to
/( − 1) and is constant, as usually in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model.
With strategic interactions (τ = 1), since the product diversity Nt is pro-
cyclical and νt/(νt−1) is decreasing in Nt, the mark-up factor 1/m(at, Kt−1)
is variable and countercyclical. Note that several empirical studies provide
an empirical support for procyclical business formation and countercycli-
cal mark-ups (Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), Portier (1995),
Martins and Scarpetta (1999)).
Substituting (13), (14) and (18) into equations (7) and (10), we determine
the two dynamic equations:
Kt = [1− α(Dm(at+1, Kt)AR(at+1))]m(at, Kt−1)AW (at)Kt−1/at (19)
(1/(BD))U∗ [Dm(at+1, Kt)AR(at+1)]m(at, Kt−1)AW (at) = v′(Kt−1/at)
(20)
Deﬁnition 1 An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a se-
quence (Kt−1, at) ∈ R2++, t = 1, 2, ...,∞, such that (19) and (20) are satisﬁed,
given K0 > 0.
Equations (19) and (20) rule the dynamics of the model and deﬁne a
two-dimensional dynamic system with one predetermined variable, aggregate
capital Kt−1. Given (Kt−1, at), we are able to determine (Kt, at+1).
3 Existence of a Steady State
A steady state of the dynamic system (19)-(20) is a solution (Kt−1 = K, at =
a), for all t, such that:
[1− α(Dm(a,K)AR(a))]A = a
m(a,K)W (a)
(21)
(1/(BD))U∗ [Dm(a,K)AR(a)]m(a,K)AW (a) = v′(K/a) (22)
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Following Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998) and Aloi, Dixon,
and Lloyd-Braga (2000), we ensure the existence of a steady state, namely
with K = K, a = a,12 by choosing appropriate values of the three scaling
parameters A > 0, B > 0, and D > 0.13 Using (8), we ﬁrst notice that the
left hand side of equation (21) increases with respect to A. Furthermore,
limA→0[1− α(Dm(a,K)AR(a))]A = 0. Therefore, under the assumption:
Assumption 3 limA→+∞[1− α(Dm(a,K)AR(a))]A > 1/(m(a,K)W (a)).
there exists a unique solution A∗ to the equation:
[1− α(Dm(a,K)A∗R(a))]A∗ = 1
m(a,K)W (a)
(23)
Especially, this last equation is satisﬁed for D = D∗, with:
D∗ = 1/[m(a,K)A∗R(a)] (24)
Given A∗ and D∗, one can easily see that there exists a unique solution
B∗ > 0 to the equation:
B∗ = (1/D∗)U∗(1)m(a,K)A∗W (a)/v′(K/a) (25)
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, (K, a) = (K, a) is a stationary so-
lution of the dynamic system (19)-(20) if and only if A, B and D are the
unique solutions of (23), (24) and (25).
Note that for D = D∗, we have α(1), η(1) and U∗(1) at the steady state,
i.e., these three functions do not depend on the steady state.
Before studying local dynamics, it is useful to deﬁne the following rela-
tionships. First, we note s(a) ≡ f ′(a)a/f(a) ∈ (0, 1) the capital share in
production.14 Moreover, if we note σ(a) the elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labor, 1/σ(a) = dlnW (a)/dlna − dlnR(a)/dlna. Since
W ′(a) = −aR′(a), we obtain:
W ′(a)a/W (a) = s(a)/σ(a) and R′(a)a/R(a) = −(1− s(a))/σ(a) (26)
12Since we will study local dynamics around the steady state (K, a) = (K, a), N > 2 is
required at this steady state, which is equivalent to f(a)K/(φa) > ε(2− τ) + τ .
13Note that the positive and ﬁnite levels of K and a can be chosen arbitrarily. The main
advantage of using this method to establish the existence of a steady state is the following.
In the next section where we study local dynamics, a modiﬁcation of an elasticity, evaluated
at the steady state, will not change the steady state levels K and a ensured by A, B and
D.
14Using (13) and (16), we can show that ρtkt−1/yt = f ′(at)at/f(at) ≡ s(at).
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We also compute the elasticities of the inverse of the mark-up factor
m(a,K) with respect to K and a:
εm,K(a,K) ≡ ∂m(a,K)
∂K
K
m(a,K)
=
τφa
f(a)K − τφa (27)
εm,a(a,K) ≡ ∂m(a,K)
∂a
a
m(a,K)
= −(1− s(a))εm,K(a,K) (28)
Note that without strategic interaction (τ = 0), we obviously have that
εm,K(a,K) = εm,a(a,K) = 0, because the mark-up is constant. With strate-
gic interactions between the producers (τ = 1), both the capital and labor
aﬀect positively the inverse of the mark-up. Indeed, since a = K/L, these
two eﬀects are measured by εm,K(a,K) + εm,a(a,K) = s(a)εm,K(a,K) > 0
and −εm,a(a,K) = (1 − s(a))εm,K(a,K) > 0 respectively. Since both these
expressions linearly depend on εm,K(a,K), this last term will be interpreted
as a measure of the degree of mark-up variability in the rest of the paper.
4 Local Dynamics
We study local dynamics to analyze the occurrence of local indeterminacy
and endogenous cycles. To underline the role of strategic interactions and
mark-up variability on the dynamics, we consider ﬁrst the model without
strategic interaction characterized by a constant mark-up (τ = 0). In a
second step, we analyze the dynamics when there are strategic interactions
and a variable mark-up (τ = 1). We will see that the substitution between
capital and labor will play a key role on the stability properties of the steady
state.
Log-linearizing the dynamic system (19)-(20) in the neighborhood of the
steady state (K, a) = (K, a), we get:
Proposition 2 Note α ≡ α(1), η ≡ η(1), s ≡ s(a), σ ≡ σ(a), εm,K ≡
εm,K(a,K) and εv ≡ εv(K/a).15 Under Assumptions 1-3, the characteristic
polynomial is deﬁned by P (λ) ≡ λ2−Trλ+Det = 0, where the trace Tr and
the determinant Det of the associated Jacobian matrix are respectively given
15Notice that many elasticities that enter the characteristic polynomial depend on the
steady state (K, a). Since we study dynamics in the neighborhood of this steady state and
the steady state levels of capital K and capital-labor ratio a are ensured by the scaling
parameters A, B and D, these elasticities can be considered as parameters.
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by:
Tr =
σεm,K(αs− 1) + (1− αη)εm,K + s+ (1− α)(1− s)
(1− α)(1− s)(σεm,K + 1)
+ εv
σ(1 + sα(1− η)εm,K)− α(1− η)(1− s)
(1− α)(1− s)(σεm,K + 1) (29)
Det =
s
(1− s)(1− α)(1 + εv) (30)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The characteristic polynomial P (λ) is useful to analyze the local stability
(indeterminacy) of the steady state and the occurrence of bifurcations. Eval-
uating P (λ) at λ = −1, 0 and 1, the steady state is locally indeterminate
when P (1) > 0, P (−1) > 0 and P (0) < 1. In this case, the two eigenvalues
have a modulus smaller than one and ﬂuctuations coming from the volatility
of expectations can occur in a neighborhood of the steady state. In all other
cases, the steady state is determinate, being a saddle if P (1) > 0 > P (−1)
or P (−1) > 0 > P (1) and a source otherwise.
Moreover, following the continuous change of a parameter, when P (1) =
0, one eigenvalue crosses the value 1 and there is generically an exchange of
stability between two steady states, through the occurrence of a transcritical
bifurcation. When P (−1) = 0, one eigenvalue crosses the value −1 and a
cycle of period 2 generically appears, through the occurrence of a ﬂip bifur-
cation. When P (1) > 0, P (−1) > 0 and P (0) = 1, the two eigenvalues are
complex conjugates and have a modulus crossing the value 1. Therefore, an
invariant closed curve generically appears around the steady state, through
a Hopf bifurcation.16
We will now use this methodology to analyze the occurrence of endoge-
nous ﬂuctuations in our model. To be able to make clear the role of strategic
interactions on the dynamics, we begin by brieﬂy considering the case where
producers behave as in the so-called Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model, i.e., the
framework without strategic interaction and mark-up variability.
4.1 No Strategic Interaction and Constant Mark-up
Without strategic interaction, we have τ = 0. Therefore, εm,K = 0, i.e., the
mark-up factor is constant and equal to ε/(ε − 1). The stability properties
of the steady state are summarized in the following proposition:
16As it is shown by Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), when there is one prede-
termined and one non-predetermined variable, cycles are subject to sunspot equilibria if
they are locally stable.
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Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-3, a constant mark-up (τ = 0), s <
1/2 and α < (1− 2s)/(1− s), the following generically holds.
1. When η ≥ 1− s/[α(1− s)] and σ < α(1−η)(1− s)+ s, the steady state
is locally indeterminate for εv < εvH .
2. When η < 1− s/[α(1− s)],
(i) if σ < α(1− η)(1− s)− s, the steady state is locally indeterminate
for εv < min{εvH , εvF };
(ii) if σ ∈ (α(1− η)(1− s)− s, α(1− η)(1− s) + s), the steady state is
locally indeterminate for εv < εvH .
In all other cases, the steady state is a saddle or a source, i.e., locally deter-
minate. Moreover, when εv crosses the value εvH , a Hopf bifurcation generi-
cally occurs, while when εv crosses the value εvF , a ﬂip bifurcation generically
occurs, with:
εvH ≡ (1− α)(1− s)/s− 1 and εvF ≡
2[s+ (1− α)(1− s)]
α(1− η)(1− s)− s− σ (31)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
In the absence of strategic interaction, i.e., under a constant mark-up, lo-
cal indeterminacy and endogenous cycles require a weak elasticity of capital-
labor substitution (σ < α(1 − η)(1 − s) + s) and a suﬃciently elastic labor
supply (1/εv). Note that these results are closely related to those obtained
under perfect competition.17 Indeed, under monopolistic competition, en-
dogenous product diversity and a constant mark-up, imperfect competition
has no inﬂuence on local dynamics. We have εm,K = 0 and, by direct in-
spection of equations (29) and (30), neither the mark-up factor /(− 1) nor
the ﬁxed cost φ aﬀect the determinant Det and the trace Tr of the Jacobian
matrix.
Especially, when the propensity to consume at the ﬁrst period of life
is zero (α = 0), we recover the results obtained by Reichlin (1986). The
occurrence of endogenous ﬂuctuations requires an elasticity of capital-labor
substitution smaller than the capital share in income, which needs to be
smaller than one half (σ < s < 1/2).18 However, when the propensity to
save becomes smaller than 1 (α > 0), the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution in consumption has a role on the stability properties. When there is
17See Reichlin (1986), Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004) and Nourry and Venditti (2006).
18Note that we obtain the same conclusion when α > 0 but η = 1.
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intertemporal substitutability (η > 1), indeterminacy emerges for a smaller
range of elasticities of capital-labor substitution, whereas intertemporal com-
plementarity (η < 1) increases the range of the elasticity σ for indeterminacy.
To give now an intuitive interpretation of these results, recall that the
dynamics are deﬁned by the two following equations:
Kt = (1− α(Dρt+1))ωtLt (32)
(1/(BD))U∗(Dρt+1)ωt = v′(Lt) (33)
To explain the occurrence of ﬂuctuations driven by self-fulﬁlling expec-
tations, consider ﬁrst that savings do not depend on the future real interest
rate (η = 1) or that there is a unit propensity to save (α = 0). Assume that
consumers expect a higher future real interest rate ρt+1. From (33), they
increase their labor supply ((dLt/dρt+1)(ρt+1/Lt) = (1 − α)/εv > 0). Since
the mark-up is constant, the labor income ωtLt decreases only if the capital-
labor substitution is suﬃciently small (1− s/σ < 0). In this case, savings Kt
decrease (see (32)), implying an increase of the future real interest rate ρt+1.
We deduce that two eﬀects are crucial for expectation driven ﬂuctuations:
the eﬀect of the future real interest rate on the current labor supply and the
negative eﬀect of labor supply on labor income. The ﬁrst one is suﬃciently
strong if εv is small enough and the second one requires σ < s.
Assuming now that households consume in both period (0 < α < 1)
and have a non-unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
(η 6= 1), there is an adding eﬀect. Indeed, if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is greater than one (η > 1), the ﬁnal increase
of the future real interest rate raises savings through its positive eﬀect on
the propensity to save (1− α(Dρt+1)). Therefore, the decrease of capital Kt
and, hence, the emergence of expectation driven ﬂuctuations requires a lower
substitution between capital and labor. On the contrary, if the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is smaller than one (η < 1), en-
dogenous ﬂuctuations can occur for an elasticity of capital-labor substitution
greater than s, because the propensity to save is decreasing in the future
real interest rate. Finally, note that this economic intuition does not only al-
lows us to recover the main conclusions of Proposition 3, but also underlines
that, without strategic interaction, imperfect competition has no role on the
occurrence of expectation driven ﬂuctuations.
We consider now the case with strategic interactions between producers
and mark-up variability (εm,K 6= 0). We will see that, in this case, endogenous
ﬂuctuations can occur when capital and labor are not weak substitutes.
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4.2 Strategic Interactions and Variable Mark-up
When there are strategic interactions, we have τ = 1 and the mark-up fac-
tor is counter-cyclical (εm,K > 0). In the next proposition, we analyze the
implications of such a market power variability on local indeterminacy and
endogenous cycles. For simpliﬁcation, we focus on the case where labor sup-
ply is inﬁnitely elastic (εv = 0).19
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-3, a variable mark-up (τ = 1), an
inﬁnitely elastic labor supply (εv = 0), s < 1/2 and α < (1− 2s)/(1− s), the
following generically holds.
1. When η < 1/α, the steady state is locally indeterminate if σT < σ < σF .
2. When η ≥ 1/α, the steady state is locally indeterminate if εm,K <
2[s+ (1− α)(1− s)]/(αη − 1) and σ < σF .
In all other cases, the steady state is locally determinate. Moreover, when
σ crosses the value σT , a transcritical bifurcation generically occurs, while
when σ crosses the value σF , a ﬂip bifurcation generically occurs, with:
σT ≡ 1− αη
2− α and σF ≡
(1− αη)εm,K + 2[s+ (1− α)(1− s)]
αεm,K(1− 2s) (34)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When there are strategic interactions between producers and a variable
mark-up, ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling expectations and endogenous cy-
cles emerge for high values of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution.20
Hence, this result is in contrast to the one obtained in the previous subsec-
tion where the monopolistic competition model without strategic interaction
is studied and endogenous ﬂuctuations require a suﬃciently small elasticity
σ (see Proposition 3). Therefore, strategic interactions have a key role on
the dynamics, promoting local indeterminacy when capital and labor are not
weak substitutes.
We also note that the conﬁguration considered in several previous pa-
pers,21 where households do not consume at their ﬁrst period of life, i.e.,
α = 0, seems to be quite speciﬁc. The upper bound σF disappears and case
19Since Hansen (1985), this assumption is often introduced in macroeconomic dynamic
models.
20Notice that these results are obtained assuming an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply. By
continuity, they are still relevant for a suﬃciently elastic labor supply.
21One can refer to Reichlin (1986), Cazzavillan (2001) and Dos Santos Ferreira and
Lloyd-Braga (2005).
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1 of Proposition 4 applies: local indeterminacy occurs for all σ > 1/2.22
Moreover, the range of capital-labor substitution for indeterminacy does not
depend on the degree of mark-up variability, measured by εm,K . However,
the results are diﬀerent when the propensity to consume at the ﬁrst period
is strictly positive (α > 0).
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, a variable mark-up (τ = 1), an in-
ﬁnitely elastic labor supply (εv = 0), s < 1/2 and (1− 2s)/(1− s) > α > 0,
the range for indeterminacy of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ
is decreasing in εm,K. Moreover, when σ > (1 − αη)/[α(1 − 2s)] and εm,K
increases, the steady state is locally indeterminate for εm,K < εFm,K, a ﬂip bi-
furcation generically occurs for εm,K = εFm,K, and the steady state is a saddle
for εm,K > εFm,K, with:
εFm,K ≡ 2
s+ (1− α)(1− s)
αη − 1 + α(1− 2s)σ (35)
Proof. See the Appendix. 
This corollary shows that a larger degree of mark-up variability, through
a higher level of εm,K , reduces the range for indeterminacy of the elastic-
ity of capital-labor substitution. Furthermore, when the level of mark-up
variability is high enough, indeterminacy can even be ruled out: a locally
indeterminate steady state can become a saddle, i.e., determinate. It is how-
ever worth to note that cycles of period two generically occur, through a ﬂip
bifurcation, for a weaker substitution between capital and labor when the
degree of mark-up variability is higher.23
Because εm,K = φa/[f(a)K − φa] (see equation (27)), there is a positive
relationship between the degree of mark-up variability and the level of the
ﬁxed cost φ, i.e., the level of increasing returns. From Corollary 1, we deduce
that smaller (increasing) returns to scale raise the range for indeterminacy of
the elasticity of capital-labor substitution. This also means that the results
obtained in this paper do not require large increasing returns.24 This is in
accordance with several empirical studies (Basu and Fernald (1995), Burn-
side (1996), Basu and Fernald (1997)) underlining that too large increasing
returns are not admissible.
We give now an economic interpretation of our results. For simpliﬁca-
tion, we consider the case of a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
22Using (34), we notice that when α tends to 0, σT tends to 1/2 and σF to +∞.
23Note that σF is decreasing from +∞ when εm,K is increasing from 0 (see (34)).
24Cazzavillan (2001) and Lloyd-Braga, Nourry, and Venditti (2007) obtain related con-
clusions in overlapping generations models where increasing returns are due to productive
externalities.
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consumption (η = 1), implying that the propensity to save does not depend
on the future real interest rate. Then, the dynamics are governed by the two
following equations:
Kt = (1− α)ωtLt (36)
(1/(BD))U∗(Dρt+1)ωt = v′(Lt) (37)
It is useful to recall that the real wage and the real interest rate are
aﬀected by the inverse of mark-up factor, increasing in aggregate capital and
labor because of strategic interactions between producers. Moreover, under
the assumptions of Proposition 4, we have σT > s, i.e., the labor income ωtLt
is increasing in Lt for all σ > σT , even if the degree of mark-up variability
is arbitrarily small. The economic intuition we give now is based on the
existence of non monotonic trajectories of the capital stock. Assume that
we deviate from the steady state by an increase of capital Kt−1. This raises
labor income ωtLt and, therefore, future capital Kt (see (36)). Following such
a sequence, consumers expect a decrease of the future real interest rate ρt+1.
From (37), they decrease their current labor supply. This feedback eﬀect
negatively aﬀects the labor income. Hence, a non monotonic trajectory of
capital emerges if this second eﬀect coming from consumers' expectations
dominates. This is possible if the mark-up is variable because, in this case,
a variation of aggregate labor has two eﬀects on the real wage: the usual
one through the marginal productivity of labor and a second one through
the inverse of mark-up. Indeed, following a decrease of labor, aggregate
production reduces, which has a negative eﬀect on the product diversity.
Since each producer has less competitors, it increases is mark-up, which
negatively aﬀects the real wage.
To conclude this economic intuition, note that the capital path initially
due to a deviation from the steady state has to be locally stable. Therefore,
even if the feedback eﬀect, through which both the labor supply and the
labor income reduce, has to dominate, it should not be too large because,
otherwise, some form of instability emerges and the steady state is deter-
minate. Since the elasticity of labor income with respect to labor can be
given by (∂ωL/∂L)(L/ωL) = 1 + (1 − s)εm,K − s/σ, this occurs especially
if the degree of mark-up variability is suﬃciently large and inputs are high
substitutes (see Corollary 1).
We conclude this section by providing a numerical illustration of our ﬁnd-
ings and underline that endogenous ﬂuctuations occur under more relevant
degrees of capital-labor substitution when producers behave strategically and
mark-up is variable. To do that, we choose a usual value for the capital share
in income, s = 1/3. To satisfy the assumption α < (1 − 2s)/(1 − s), we set
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α = 0.4 and, as in Proposition 4 and Corollary 1, we restrict our attention
to εv = 0, which could be justiﬁed by indivisible labor. Furthermore, several
empirical studies ﬁnd small values for the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution in consumption. However, in our overlapping generations model, this
implies that savings are decreasing in the future real interest rate, whereas
the opposite relationship between savings and the real interest rate seems to
be more reasonable. To avoid this diﬃculty, we assume η = 1.
Using this parametrization, we can easily see that, without strategic in-
teraction and mark-up variability, the occurrence of indeterminacy requires
σ < 1/3 (see Proposition 3), i.e., a too weak elasticity of capital-labor substi-
tution to be in accordance with empirical studies (see Duﬀy and Papageorgiou
(2000)). In the presence of strategic interactions and mark-up variability, case
1 of Proposition 4 applies, i.e., local indeterminacy requires σT < σ < σF .
Evaluating the lower bound, we get σT = 0.375. Taking as given the degree
of mark-up variability εm,K , the upper bound is given by σF = 4.5+11/εm,K .
To determine now the admissible values for εm,K , recall that the number of
producers has to be strictly greater than 2 around the steady state. This
implies that f(a)K/(φa) > 1 + ε. Using this inequality and equation (27),
we obtain εm,K < 1/ε < 1. Therefore, when εm,K increases from 0, the upper
bound σF decreases from +∞, but is always strictly greater than 15.5. We
conclude that with strategic interactions and mark-up variability, indetermi-
nacy occurs for a large range of elasticities of capital-labor substitution, that
encompasses the Cobb-Douglas case (σ = 1) and all the empirically relevant
values (see Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000)).
5 Conclusion
In macroeconomics, the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition
model is the most commonly used framework to introduce imperfect compe-
tition on product markets. As it is well known, this model rules out strategic
interactions between producers. In this paper, we stress that this approach
of imperfect competition can be misleading to understand the role of product
market imperfections on expectation driven ﬂuctuations.
We analyze a model that encompasses the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) frame-
work as a particular case, but also allows us to consider the case where
producers have strategic interactions (Yang and Hejdra (1993)). Since the
product diversity is endogenously determined by a zero proﬁt condition, the
mark-up factor is variable under strategic behaviors, whereas it is constant
in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) approach. Using an overlapping generations
model, we show that this mark-up variability signiﬁcantly aﬀects the dy-
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namic properties of the steady state. Indeed, in contrast to the conﬁguration
without strategic interaction, indeterminacy does not require a too weak elas-
ticity of capital-labor substitution when the mark-up is variable, but occurs
for a large and plausible range of this elasticity. Therefore, strategic behav-
iors of producers seem to play a key role to understand the occurrence of
endogenous ﬂuctuations.
More generally, our conclusions suggest that taking into account imper-
fectly competitive behaviors of ﬁrm still constitutes an important issue to
understand macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, as soon as one considers a signiﬁ-
cant departure from the perfect competition.
Appendix
The existence of α(Dρt+1)
The ﬁrst order condition of the utility maximization can be written:
(1/D)U1(C1t/D,C2t+1)
U2(C1t/D,C2t+1)
= ρt+1 (38)
Since U is homogeneous of degree 1, U1 and U2 are homogeneous of degree
0. Therefore, equation (38) is equivalent to:
g(C1t/(DC2t+1)) ≡ U1(C1t/(DC2t+1), 1)
U2(1, (DC2t+1)/C1t)
= Dρt+1 (39)
where g is a decreasing function. We deduce that there exists an inverse
function g−1 such that C1t = Dg−1(Dρt+1)C2t+1. Substituting this equation
into the lifetime budget constraint C1t + C2t+1/ρt+1 = ωtLt, we obtain:
α(Dρt+1) =
Dρt+1g
−1(Dρt+1)
1 +Dρt+1g−1(Dρt+1)
(40)
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption
We deﬁne:
C1t
DC2t+1
=
α(Dρt+1)
(1− α(Dρt+1))Dρt+1 ≡ H(Dρt+1) (41)
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The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption η(Dρt+1) is
determined by the elasticity of H, in absolute value:
η(Dρt+1) = −H
′(Dρt+1)Dρt+1
H(Dρt+1)
(42)
After some computations, we obtain the expression given in (8).
Deﬁnition and Elasticity of U∗
Substituting (5) and (6) into the function U(C1t/D,C2t+1) times D, we
deﬁne U∗(Dρt+1) as follows:
U(α(Dρt+1), (1− α(Dρt+1))Dρt+1)ωtLt ≡ U∗(Dρt+1)ωtLt (43)
Note that both sides of this equation linearly depend on the wage income.
Furthermore, using the ﬁrst order condition U1 = U2Dρt+125 and the Euler
identity U(α, (1− α)Dρt+1) = U1α+ U2(1− α)Dρt+1, we have:
U∗
′
Dρt+1 = (U1−U2Dρt+1)α′Dρt+1+U2Dρt+1(1−α) = U∗(1−α) > 0 (44)
We deduce that the elasticity of U∗(Dρt+1) is given by 1− α(Dρt+1).
Proof of Proposition 2
To get the characteristic polynomial, we log-linearize the dynamic system
(19)-(20) in the neighborhood of the steady state (K, a) = (K, a). Using
equations (8), (26), (27), (28) and the elasticity of U∗(Dρt+1) evaluated at
the steady state, we obtain:
dKt
K
= J11
dKt−1
K
+ J12
dat
a
dat+1
a
= J21
dKt−1
K
+ J22
dat
a
25In order to simplify the notations, we do not write the arguments of the functions
when this is not confusing and we note Ui ≡ ∂U(x1, x2)/∂xi, i = 1, 2.
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with:
J11 = 1 + εm,K +
α(1− η)
1− α (εm,K − εv) (45)
J12 = −(1− s)εm,K − 1 + s
σ
+
α(1− η)
1− α
[
εv +
s
σ
− (1− s)εm,K
]
(46)
J21 =
εm,K(1 + εm,K)
(1− s)(εm,K + 1/σ) +
[1 + α(1− η)εm,K ](εm,K − εv)
(1− α)(1− s)(εm,K + 1/σ) (47)
J22 = − εm,K
(1− s)(εm,K + 1/σ)
[
(1− s)εm,K + 1− s
σ
]
(48)
+
1 + α(1− η)εm,K
(1− α)(1− s)(εm,K + 1/σ)
[
εv +
s
σ
− (1− s)εm,K
]
As it is well known, the trace Tr and the determinant Det of the associ-
ated Jacobian matrix are deﬁned by Tr = J11+J22 andDet = J11J22−J12J21.
Using equations (45)− (48), we obtain (29) and (30).
Proof of Proposition 3
When εv tends to 0, P (0) = Det is strictly smaller than 1 because s < 1/2
and α < (1−2s)/(1−s). We deduce that because Det is increasing in εv, Det
is strictly smaller than 1 if εv < εvH , equal to 1 if εv = εvH , and strictly greater
than 1 if εv > εvH , where the critical value εvH is given in the proposition.
Since τ = 0, we have εm,K = 0. Using equations (29) and (30), P (1) =
1− T +D and P (−1) = 1 + T +D are respectively equal to:
P (1) = εv
s+ α(1− η)(1− s)− σ
(1− α)(1− s) (49)
P (−1) = 2(s+ (1− α)(1− s)) + εv(σ + s− α(1− η)(1− s))
(1− α)(1− s) (50)
We can notice that P (1) > 0 if and only if σ < α(1− η)(1− s) + s, and
P (1) ≤ 0 otherwise. When η ≥ 1 − s/[α(1 − s)], P (−1) is strictly positive
for all σ > 0 and εv > 0. We deduce that when η ≥ 1 − s/(α(1 − s)),
the occurrence of local indeterminacy requires σ < α(1 − η)(1 − s) + s and
εv < εvH .
Considering now that η < 1− s/[α(1− s)], there are three subcases:
• If σ < α(1− η)(1− s)− s, P (1) > 0 and P (−1) > 0 if εv < εvF , where
the critical value εvF is given in the proposition. Therefore, the steady
state is locally indeterminate for εv < min{εvH , εvF };
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• If σ ∈ (α(1−η)(1−s)−s, α(1−η)(1−s)+s), P (1) > 0 and P (−1) > 0 for
all εv > 0. Therefore, the steady is locally indeterminate for εv < εvH ;
• If σ > α(1 − η)(1 − s) + s, P (1) < 0 and P (−1) > 0 for all εv > 0.
Then, the steady state is always a saddle, i.e., locally determinate.
Proof of Proposition 4
Under εv = 0, Det belongs to (0, 1) because s < 1/2 and α < (1−2s)/(1−
s) (see equation (30)). Furthermore, using equations (29) and (30), we are
able to determine P (1) and P (−1):
P (1) = εm,K
σ(2− α)− (1− αη)
(1− α)(1− s)(σεm,K + 1) (51)
P (−1) = (1− αη)εm,K + 2[s+ (1− α)(1− s)]− σαεm,K(1− 2s)
(1− α)(1− s)(σεm,K + 1) (52)
We deduce that when η < 1/α, P (1) > 0 if and only if σ > σT and
P (−1) > 0 if and only if σ < σF , where the critical values σT and σF are given
in the proposition. Therefore, local indeterminacy occurs for σT < σ < σF .
When η ≥ 1/α, P (1) > 0 for all σ > 0. Moreover, when εm,K ≥ 2[s +
(1−α)(1− s)]/(αη− 1), P (−1) < 0 for all σ. On the contrary, when εm,K <
2[s+(1−α)(1−s)]/(αη−1), P (−1) > 0 if σ < σF and P (−1) ≤ 0 otherwise.
Hence, local indeterminacy requires εm,K < 2[s + (1 − α)(1 − s)]/(αη − 1)
and σ < σF in this case.
Proof of Corollary 1
We begin by noting that Det does not depend on εm,K and belongs to
(0, 1) because, as in Proposition 4, εv = 0, s < 1/2 and α < (1− 2s)/(1− s).
Then, the ﬁrst part of the corollary is proved noting that σT does not depend
on εm,K and σF decreases with respect to εm,K .
In order to show the second part of the corollary, we notice that for
σ > (1 − αη)/[α(1 − 2s)], we have P (1) > 0. Moreover, P (−1) > 0 if
εm,K < ε
F
m,K , P (−1) = 0 if εm,K = εFm,K , and P (−1) < 0 if εm,K > εFm,K ,
where the critical value εFm,K is given in the corollary.
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